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2 Transition to a market 
economy 
Explaining the successes and failures 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 
China has grown remarkably since it began its transition to a market economy more th 
three decades ago-far better than Russia. 1 The reasons for this hold important lesson 
for economics. 
There are two categories of explanations for the differences in performance: (a) the tw 
countries faced different circumstances; (b) they undertook different policies. It is impos 
sible to fully untangle the explanations: differences in circumstances would naturally lea 
to differences in policies. Independent of circumstance, however, various economists di 
support highly different policies-in pacing, sequencing, and priorities. Some called fo 
shock therapy, focusing on macroeconomic adjustments; others for gradualism, focus 
ing more on microeconomic issues. Different economists held contradicting opinions o 
privatization-a high priority for/ Washington Consensus supporters-and on institu-
tions, competition, the role of government, and the pace ofliberalization for capital an 
financial markets and trade. 
At least through the first decades of transition, the contrast in the policy bundles pur-
sued by the two countries could not have been greater. Russia followed, though imper-
fectly, the Washington Consensus shock therapy policies; China followed an alternative 
course. Inevitably then, the advocates of Washington Consensus2 policies attribute Rus-
sia's (comparative and absolute) failures either to deficiencies in following the prescrip-
tions, or to its different circumstances. 
The real flaw, I argue, is with the Washington Consensus and the policies based on 
it. If anything, the circumstances favoured Russia. Further, even if Russia imperfectly 
1 
This chapter is based on previous work (listed in the references) by the author and several co-authors 
(Karla Hoff, Yingyi Qian, David Ellerman, Athar Hussain, Sergio Godoy, and Nicholas Stern) to whom he is 
greatly indebted. 
2 
There is no way of simply and accurately summarizing the policies advocated by the 'shock therapists' 
and the international financial institutions. Still, it is useful to group the two strategies according to some 























TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY 37 
followed the Washington Consensus policies, China's successful policies deviated 
from them even more. In fact, there is a causal link between Russia's policies and its 
poor performance, an interpretation consistent with cross-country and time-series 
empirical work. 
A purported defence of the economic failure is that there was a political transformation 
going on as well, which the economic transformation was responsible for 'locking in'. But 
the strategy failed to create a vibrant democratic Russia, and the economic strategy may 
in fact have contributed to this political failure. 
2.1 The contrasting performance 
Russia's performance in the initial years of transition was particularly disappointing: 
between 1990 and 1999, real GDP per capita fell by 38 per cent. There were concomi-
tant indicators of failure, such as a decline of three years in life expectancy and large 
outmigration of some of the coun.try's most talented individuals. The country dein-
dustrialized, becoming increasingly simply an exporter of raw materials (especially 
oil and gas). 
Of course, Russia had inherited a distorted economic system. Capital and labour had 
been misallocated; innovation had been suppressed. But in a sense, that only meant it had 
more room for improvement. Replacing an inefficient economic system (central planning 
with decentralization; quotas with market-based incentives) should have ensured that the 
country's resources were better used. Output should have gone up. 
By contrast, in the same period, China's per capita income more than doubled, and life 
expectancy increased by two years. Technical capacities grew. By 2010, it was becoming 
a technological leader in some fields. As it restructured its economy away from primary 
production, China became the largest producer of industrial goods. 
2.2 The flawed economic model 
Russia's failed policies were overly influenced by the neoclassical model, which ignored 
market frictions (imperfect information, imperfect competition, imperfect markets). In 
reality, social and private returns were often not aligned. While the advocates of rapid 
transition prided themselves in at last providing incentives to market participants, what 
they did not realize was that those incentives were, in many cases, perverse; they were 
directed more at asset-stripping than at wealth creation. 
· The irony was that while these policies' proponents often talked about the importance 
of 'governance: they failed to note pervasive problems of corporate governance that can 
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arise when there are inadequate corporate governance statutes. 3 By contrast, the critics 
of shock therapy stressed the importance of the 'institutional infrastructure', including 
corporate governance. 
Still another flaw in the Washington Consensus was the belief that as government activ-
ities (such as providing credit, inputs, etc.) were stripped away, competitive and efficient 
markets would spontaneously arise to fill the gap. Typically they did not. The absence of 
capital markets (banks) that were experienced in project selection and monitoring and 
contract enforcement, combined with weak entrepreneurship, meant that when jobs and 
enterprises were destroyed, new ones were not created. 4 
The advocates of shock therapy also underestimated the importance of social capital in 
making economies (and societies more generally) function. The Soviet Union had done 
much to destroy civil society and civic engagement. Even if appropriate legal structures 
had been put into place, they would have been an imperfect substitute. But transition 
under shock therapy eviscerated social capital even more and did not create the 'institu-
tional infrastructure' necessary for an effectively functioning market economy-or for 
democracy. 
So too, overly simplistic macro-models that paid insufficient attention to credit and 
credit institutions led to monetary policies that for a time moved much of Russia back to 
an inefficient barter system (all in the name of taming inflation). 
As a result, Washington Consensus policies (including privatization and liberalization) 
did not bring the promised benefits. This should not have been a surprise, considering 
there was little theory and no historical basis for shock therapists' faith in rapid privatiza-
tion. By contrast, there was ample historical evidence of the problems facing societies in 
the absence of good legal and financial institutions. 
Just as the advocates of the shock therapy model were excessively optimistic about 
the results they expected, they were excessively pessimistic about the ad hoc nature 
of the Chinese reforms. But the 'partial' reforms were effective. (a) China's move to 
the individual responsibility system provided effective incentives in the agriculture 
sector, even though it did not entail full privatization. It provided most of the benefits 
that would have been achieved with full privatization, without the adverse political 
and social consequences. (b) China put more emphasis on competition than privati-
zation, especially in the early stages. 5 Both were necessary to achieve the full benefits 
of a market, and priorities had to be contingent on local circumstances. Township and 
village enterprises involved continued public ownership (though at the local level), 
3 Berle and Means (1932) stressed the importance of the separation of ownership and control; the eco-
nomics of information put the theory of corporate governance on rigorous theoretical foundations, see for 
example Stiglitz (1985). 
4 Ellerman and I ( 2000) also emphasized the consequences of the absence of small enterprises in the Soviet 
regime. 
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but provided the basis for vigorous competition. ( c) One of the original challenges 
was how to move from the distorted price system under the old regime to a more 
market-based price system. The Chinese cleverly used a two-part price system-
though conventional wisdom at the time argued against these kinds of pricing me cha -
nisms. (d) China was slow to move to trade liberalization-and even now has not fully 
liberalized its capital account. Strong government intervention enabled the country to 
avoid the instability (and often high unemployment) that marked those who liberal-
ized too rapidly. It provided time for development of a domestic entrepreneurial class. 
(e) Industrialization was also aided by strong industrial policies, including the man-
e agement of the exchange rate (to keep it competitive)-policies that were eschewed 
by the Washington Consensus. 
2.3 The flawed political model 
There was a nai:Ve belief that a newly established class of wealthy individuals would have 
incentives to create the legal and institutional infrastructure that would enable a mar-
ket economy to function well. There were at least four key flaws. (a) Those with economic 
power wish to perpetuate it, devising rules that benefit themselves, but would not necessar-
ily make the economic system work better. Wealthy individuals use their wealth, including 
through political influence, to enhance their rents: monopolists oppose strong competition 
laws; financiers, laws that circumscribe their abuses of information asymmetries and market 
power. (b) With capital market liberalization, the rich in Russia could take their money out 
of the country and invest it in a place where there were good protections, meanwhile taking 
advantage of their superior ability at asset stripping. ( c) As a result, there was an economic 
and political equilibrium in which Russia remained 'lawless' (Hoff and Stiglitz 2004a, 2004b ). 
( d) There are further difficulties in leaving a 'lawless' state: those that follow may try to recap-
ture proceeds that are viewed as not gainfully gotten. Illegitimate privatization thus made the 
process of transition to a rule oflaw more difficult (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2007). 
2.4 Alternative explanations 
Supporters of Washington Consensus policies suggest that China's task in transition was 
easier: it was a less developed, more agrarian economy. But on average, less developed 
countries (with the exception of the East Asian countries that did not follow the Wash-
ington Consensus prescriptions) have not done well. Development is difficult. Transition 
is difficult. It is illogical to suggest that combining the two would make both tasks easier. 
And there is little evidence that the ease of transition is related to the size of an economy's 
agrarian sector. 
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Many of the studies of transition occurred in the early years. It was not clear then wheth-
er the tortoise or the hare would win: even if fast reformers among the FSU and Eastern 
Europe appeared to be doing well early on, would they be able to sustain their advantage? 
One of the few studies to be done later on was that of Godoy and Stiglitz (2007), which 
concludes that the tortoises did win-speed of privatization was negatively correlated 
with longer-run performance-and that institutions mattered. As time went on, the sig-
nificance of initial conditions (emphasized in the earlier literature) disappeared. 6 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
The end of Communism and the transition from Communism to the market economy 
was one of history's most important economic episodes. Standard theory had little to say 
about how to manage that transition, but that did not stop many economists from provid-
ing advice. Much of that was wrong; in some cases, it was counterproductive. The contrast 
between Russia and China is testimony to the benefits of pragmatism and against the reli-
ance on simplistic neoclassical models. The limitations of those models were well known 
before the transition: if those models had been right, market socialism would have been 
far more successful (Stiglitz, 1994). Chinese leaders understood that transition required 
institutional innovations and, untethered by the dictates of neoclassical economics, were 
able to devise pragmatic solutions that provided the basis of that country's three decades 
of unprecedented growth. 
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